Human rights discourse has been criticized for being legalistic, decontextualized, and failing to focus on factors explaining violations. Victor Klemperer's diaries chronicled the life and suffering of a German Jew in Nazi Germany and the manipulation of language by a totalitarian regime. Ernst Fraenkel's Dual State and Franz Neumann's Behemoth set out theories offering profound insights into the legal and political nature of the Nazi system. Revisiting their work from a human rights perspective is richly rewarding, providing examples of engaged scholarship that combined documentation and critical analysis. Their writings hold important lessons for contemporary human rights engagement and its critics.
I. INTRODUCTION
The human rights movement and language of human rights has been the subject of sustained criticism. Besides its supposed Western liberal bias, critics have focused particularly on human rights as a mode of political engagement. Human rights discourse is seen as legalistic and decontextualized. Richard Wilson argued in 1997 that human rights reports "can depoliticise human rights violations by drawing attention away from structural processes with the ostensible goal to "bear witness." 12 This was both a psychological survival strategy and a conscious effort to document in, at times excruciating, detail the nature and impact of the Nazi regime on those living under it, particularly its victims. The diary represented an act of inner resistance, aided by those close to Klemperer, and a means to chronicle developments as they were, rather than as a tool to expose violations at the time. Klemperer is by no means unique in using the means of a diary to record daily realities, either at the time or thereafter, and his work forms part of a larger body of literature of survivors and victims, of both Nazi Germany and other regimes. 13 His contribution will therefore also be discussed with reference to diaries as a genre and tool for the documentation of what a regime does to people under its control.
Fraenkel and Neumann were both trained lawyers who later combined legal studies with political science enquiries and, in the case of Neumann, also as a member of the Frankfurt School. 14 Fraenkel remained in Germany until 1938, secretly collecting a vast array of materials that enabled him to analyze the nature of the state and law in Nazi Germany from close up. On the basis of this research, he wrote The Dual State which was published in exile. 15 This classic work highlighted the Janus-faced nature of Nazi Germany, arguing that the legal system maintained a formal rule of law façade in respect to certain aspects of public life, particularly the economy, while simultaneously giving carte blanche to authorities and others to take prerogative measures that served the regime's interest. Neumann, who had escaped Germany shortly after the Nazis had come to power, is the author of another classic, Behemoth, first published in 1942. 16 In an ambitious, far-reaching book, he situated Nazi Germany in broader political and economic developments, with particular reference to the Weimar Republic, identified the 12 centers of power within the Nazi machinery, and uncovered the dynamics underpinning the dictatorial regime. The interests of monopoly capitalism and competing power elites (party, bureaucracy, army, and industry) were central to his analysis that Nazi Germany had become an Unstaat that destroyed any legal protection and ultimately relied on naked terror. Fraenkel's and Neumann's books were published during the war, and were highly influential at the time, as they documented and helped to understand the complex realties of how the regime functioned. 17 Their work has also attracted considerable scholarly attention. 18 The analysis has focused on their role as lawyers in the resistance to the Nazis, 19 their contribution to the allied fight against Germany, and their contribution to the plans for reconstruction, 20 as well as their respective understanding of the rule of law 21 and the role of natural law. 22 Additionally, Fraenkel's notion of "the dual state" has been employed as a framework of analysis to examine legal developments in South Africa and Chile; 23 Neumann's insights into how vague standards are used by powerful actors have been applied to critique the international legal system governing economic globalization; 24 and Klemperer's diaries have become a major source for historians. Together with his seminal Lingua Tertii Imperii (LTI), 25 Klemperer's works are seen as one of the most authoritative accounts of what life was like for a Jew in Nazi Germany 26 and authoritative in his analysis of the use of its language to observations, on both personal matters (his wife, friends, acquaintances, and pet) and political developments, and reflects on his and others' struggles, states of mind, and emotions. All of this is interspersed with a sophisticated analysis of the way the Nazi system operated and impacted life in Germany. Klemperer's diaries are compelling because they represent the outcome of a conscious decision "to bear witness." Klemperer was under no illusion about Nazi Germany from the very beginning. He had an astute appreciation of people's strengths and weaknesses, including his own, and the intellectual capacity and language skills to situate and analyze what he experienced in the broader context of European history and world politics. The language used reflected his position as someone who lived through the period as a forced outsider in what he considered his country, combining sober analysis with sarcasm and contempt for those whose conduct fell short of his standards. The diaries therefore provide both a highly personal but also objective account of how German Jews and other opponents or victims experienced Nazi Germany, particularly in Klemperer's circles, and were affected by its policies. 33 This account chronicles and reflects on the conduct of perpetrators, victims and bystanders, and the population at large, painting a complex picture of reality in Nazi Germany.
Klemperer described a series of abuses he was subjected to as part of the Nazi's anti-Semitic policy and practices. This included dismissal from work, expropriation, restrictions on his freedom of movement, privacy and family life, beatings, humiliation, lack of a fair trial and arbitrary detention, forced labor, and policy induced hunger and destitution that adversely impacted his health and standard of living. He also reported on detention, torture, other ill-treatment, forced labor, and killings, including suicides born out of despair, that others he knew or heard about had suffered; in several instances, he witnessed these acts or their aftermath personally.
Klemperer's response, and that of many other German Jews in a similar situation who were unable or unwilling to escape in time, was characterized by a turmoil of emotions. The "systematic arbitrariness" of measures resulted in an increased sense of vulnerability and loss of dignity, reinforced by social isolation and loneliness. 34 Fear, uncertainty, and doubt were aggravated by an acute sense of his weakness, worries and, at times, indifference towards others. Klemperer did not give into suffering by committing suicide, also because of his determination to bear witness. It offered him an alternative space that he increasingly lacked in reality and enabled him to fight back by intellectually defying the Nazis through his analysis. This included writ- I once read that fear of something is worse than the event itself. How I dreaded the house search. And when the Gestapo [Geheime Staatspolizei-Nazi secret police] came, I was quite cold and defiant. And how our food tasted afterwards! All the good things, which we had hidden and they had not found.
37
Klemperer replies:
You see, I'm going to note that down.
38
As early as April 1933, Klemperer emphasized the sense of being exposed to arbitrariness and deprived of rights, knowing that the early legislative measures may be a prelude to murder. He clearly identified the self-destructive nature of the regime and its handling of the "Jewish question":
The fate of the Hitler movement will undoubtedly be decided by the Jewish business. I do not understand why they have made this point of their program so central. It will sink them. But we will probably go down with them.
39
From 1933 to 1939 Klemperer showed how the various discriminatory measures taken against Jews resulted in increasing impoverishment, isolation, and resignation. It is a chilling chronicle of how a state systematically strips members of a particular group of their rights, protection, and self-respect. This was done by removing status, depriving Jews of their place in public life, robbing them of their possessions, and using a plethora of repressive measures and administrative means to exercise arbitrary control. Equally, it showed how a regime uses propaganda and a mixture of terror and promises to create an atmosphere of fear and conformity. In an observation that 35 highlights the importance of diplomatic protest, Klemperer foreshadowed, in September 1936, the dangers of appeasement:
One always thinks that surely somewhere in Germany voices of shame and fear must be raised, protests must come from abroad, where everywhere (even in Italy, our ally!) there are Jews in the highest positions-nothing! Admiration for the Third Reich, for its culture, trembling fear of its army and its threats.
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This observation tied in with Klemperer's broader analysis of the importance of framing:
There is no German or West European Jewish question. Whoever recognizes one, only adopts or confirms the false thesis of the NSDAP [National Socialist German Workers' Party] and serves its cause. 41 The life of Jews in Germany took a dramatic turn for the worse during the war. Klemperer and others were visibly separated from the rest of society by having to live in "Jew houses." In September 1941, they were forced to wear the "Jewish star," a measure that was experienced as particularly pernicious and humiliating. 42 Klemperer himself was increasingly subject to abuses. This took the form of arbitrary and violent searches by the Gestapo and an eight day detention in June 1941 for failure to black out. 43 From April 1943 to June 1944, he was compelled to undertake forced labor, which allowed him to portray in great detail the daily realities and political dynamics of his place of work's micro-society. Klemperer repeatedly described his sense of despondency and constant fear of death at the time: "One no longer reckons on prison or a beating, but straightaway with death for everything and anything." 44 Friends and acquaintances were driven to suicide, killed by the Gestapo, or deported, and there were increasing rumors and reports from trusted sources about concentration camps, including Auschwitz in 1942:
In the last few days I heard Auschwitz (or something like it) near Königshütte in Upper Silesia, mentioned as the most dreadful concentration camp. Work in a mine, death within a few days. 45 His end of year entry in 1942 captured the terror engulfing him:
Of the ten Nazi years thus far, this year of 1942 was the worst: We have suffered ever new humiliation, persecution, ill-treatment, slander. Murder splashed all around us, and every day we felt ourselves in mortal danger. And yet I can 40 only say: Thus far the worst year, for there is every prospect that the terror will grow more intense, and there is no telling how long the war and this government will last.
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Throughout this period, Klemperer still found time to reflect on human survival in extraordinary times:
Today over breakfast we talked about the extraordinary capacity of human beings to bear and become accustomed to things. The fantastic hideousness of our existence: fear of every ring at the door, of ill-treatment, insults, fear for one's life, of hunger (real hunger), ever new bans, ever more cruel enslavement, deadly danger coming closer every day, every day new victims all around us, absolute helplessness-and yet still hours of pleasure, while reading aloud, while working, while eating our less than meagre food, and so we go on eking out a bare existence and go on hoping.
47
Besides the detailed description of abuses and measures taken, Klemperer examined in great detail the racist and dehumanizing character of Nazi propaganda and language and how they were used to change mindsets. In his LTI, which is based on the diaries, Klemperer singles out Strafexpedition (punitive expedition), as the "first term which I recognized as being specifically National Socialist: . . . For me, the word Strafexpedition was the embodiment of brutal arrogance and contempt for people who are in any way different, it sounded so colonial." 48 Klemperer also commented on how the Nazis increasingly employed the law as an instrument of repression, 49 and reflected on the modus operandi of the regime:
What I find so much more abominable in all of this than similar things with the Russians: there is nothing spontaneous about it, everything is methodically organised and regulated, it is "cultivated" cruelty, and it happens hypocritically and mendaciously in the name of culture. No one is murdered here.
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He showed how the regime became increasingly brutal, a fact that was becoming more and more apparent, and a matter of public knowledge about atrocities: 
1942). HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
[Konrad] believes (to judge by soldiers' reports) that before the retreats everyone was murdered, that we shall see no one again, that six to seven million Jews (of the fifteen million that had existed) have been slaughtered (more exactly: shot and gassed).
51
In a twist of fate, Klemperer and his wife managed to escape impending death at the hands of the Gestapo or SS (Schutzstaffel) only because of the bombing of Dresden on 13 and 14 February 1945. This event sent them on a journey in which they came face to face with war refugees, defeated Germans, and the new occupiers. The war was over, and a new chapter opened in Klemperer's eventful life, finding himself "falling between several stools." 52
B. Assessment
Klemperer's diaries are a highly valuable source that provides a first-hand account of the systematic nature of discrimination and abuse of Jews in Nazi Germany. The diaries combine observation of incidents, patterns, and changes with an analysis of Nazi rule, particularly its use of language. Klemperer showed how the Nazis made a concerted effort to use language in order to influence perceptions and implant concepts and terms into people's minds. 53 This policy was perniciously effective, as even the opponents of the Nazis, including Klemperer himself, began using Nazi terminology. 54 Klemperer also documented how the Nazis used language both as a form of positive propaganda glorifying Nazism, especially Adolf Hitler, in a quasi-religious fashion, and as a means of justification and denial. The latter analysis is particularly impressive as Klemperer developed a technique of how to read public announcements and reports in the synchronized press to glean the truth. Having no access to other official sources, Klemperer sought to identify contradictions and a change in tone, particularly in war reporting, and succeeded in reading between the lines and making sense of the news. 55 propaganda and censorship, particularly where governments block access to alternative sources of information. The writing of diaries was not exceptional at the time and not confined to Jews. Jewish diaries have, however, taken on a particular historical significance because of the Holocaust, attracting considerable scholarly interest on the use of diaries as an expression of cultural identity, form of resistance, and literary genre. 56 It is useful to conceptualize these diaries not so much as daily or regular entries but to view them as a "discontinuous series of more or less self-contained responses to the writer's present situation and recent experience."
57 Diaries written by Jews living in Nazi Germany, in the occupied territories, or in concentration camps served multiple purposes, from the personal to the political. They constituted an act of self-preservation and spiritual survival, 58 a way of recording memory for family members and future generations, and a means of documenting abuses with a view to helping defeat the perpetrators and bringing them to justice. 59 The urge to bear witness can be understood as a form of resistance. At the personal level, it acts as self-affirmation and narrative that counters attempts to dehumanize and efface the identity of victims. 60 At the societal level, it helps families and groups to maintain their voice, dignity, and strength born out of the knowledge that their suffering is "human" and will eventually be recognized and acknowledged and their humanity restored. Those who were able to write a diary, or even survived, such as Klemperer, were privileged. The witnesses of the horrors of concentration camps and other violations, whom Primo Levi called the true witnesses, were frequently unable to tell their story. 61 Klemperer's diaries form part of this broader historical context. He was deeply convinced of the need, and determined, to bear witness, all the while being aware of the personal and collective significance of his endeavor. While he wanted to record the reality of the Third Reich as he experienced it, including its multiple injustices, there is no evidence to suggest that he wrote his diaries for the purpose of their use in holding individuals 56 Klemperer's diaries are still immensely valuable today, as a meticulous recording of facts and emotions and a close analysis of political and societal developments, as viewed from the particular position in which someone subjected to serious violations finds himself. They constitute a form of testimony and self-narrative, which escapes the criticism that has been leveled at writing about human rights, particularly human rights reports; they are not abstract and decontextualized, do not eradicate subjectivity, 64 and do not trigger concerns about "representation," that is the mode of using stories of individual suffering for advocacy purposes. 65 The medium of a diary raises the question to what degree it can serve as a form of documenting human rights violations. A diary, irrespective of its purpose, constitutes evidence of how its author witnessed and perceived events, which can be of great importance in judicial proceedings or for other bodies, such as truth and reconciliation commissions.
66 Diaries can also be written deliberately as a means of documenting the reality of daily life, including violations. This form of documentation becomes more valuable the less other means to document, and to share information, including online, are available. Diary writing therefore retains its importance especially in highly repressive environments. Prison diaries are a case in point, with the Guantanamo diaries written by Mohamedou Ould Slahi being one of the latest diaries of this kind. 67 of experiences, diaries occupy a unique space for reflection and analysis. Their personal nature is better suited than general, objective, and "neutral" reporting to convey the realities of human rights issues as a context-specific, lived reality. Nonetheless, the two forms of writing are complementary, and indeed many human rights reports include the voice and perspectives of victims. Yet, diaries have a specific quality of speaking to us directly, even years after the event, and this literary quality gives them their capacity to engender understanding, empathy, and solidarity with anyone finding himor herself in similar situations. Diaries are therefore part of human rights literature in the broadest sense whose very subjectivity and immediacy may give them a more universal appeal and salience than reports invoking the language of universal rights.
III. ERNST FRAENKEL AND FRANZ NEUMANN
Fraenkel and Neumann were the authors of two works about Nazi Germany that were almost instantly recognized as seminal. A look at their common background shows that the power and impact of their respective work is no coincidence. Rather, it was the outcome of a largely shared, sustained professional and intellectual political struggle. Both Fraenkel and Neumann were labor lawyers during the Weimar Republic who were influenced by the work of Hugo Sinzheimer, and both combined legal practice with theoretical writings and political activism while also belonging to the social democrat reformists. In 1927, the two became partners in a law firm, which they ran jointly until 1933. The Nazis coming to power in January 1933 heralded a dual assault on Fraenkel and Neumann as Jewish and social democrat lawyers. Initially, they were able to continue their work, also in the form of secretly documenting abuses. However, on 2 May 1933, their office, located in the trade unions headquarter in Berlin, was raided and attacked. These events set both men on different paths, though they remained in sporadic contact thereafter and retained considerable respect for each other's work. 
A. FRAENKEL'S DUAL STATE
Fraenkel used the period from 1933 to 1938 to collect large volumes of materials, including laws, judgments, and literature, also drawing on his own work as a lawyer. Experiencing the workings of the Nazi legal system from close quarters, he wanted to develop a theory that enabled him to better understand what he was witnessing. 72 The result of his work was The Dual State. A brief account of its key ideas was published under the pseudonym Conrad Jürges in 1937, 73 with the book first published by Oxford University Press in 1941. 74 Fraenkel viewed the state of exception, embodied in the Notverordnung (emergency decree) of 28 February 1933, as key to the legal order developed by Nazi Germany. 75 This order was characterized by the duality of the normative and prerogative state, which was central to Fraenkel's analysis:
By the Prerogative State we mean that governmental system which exercises unlimited arbitrariness and violence unchecked by any legal guarantees, and by the Normative State an administrative body endowed with elaborate powers for safeguarding the legal order as expressed in statutes, decisions of the courts, and activities of the administrative agencies. 76 Fraenkel stressed, presciently, that "when we speak of the Dual State we do not refer to the co-existence of the state bureaucracy and the party bureaucracy." 77 Instead, he viewed the duality between prerogative state and normative state as the mode of how the Nazi legal order functions, with the normative state always subject to the encroachments of the prerogative state:
There are no legal rules governing the political sphere. It is regulated by arbitrary measures (Massnahmen), in which the dominant officials exercise their discretionary prerogatives. Hence the expression 'Prerogative State' (Massnahmenstaat). 78 The only limits of the prerogative state, according to Fraenkel, were selfimposed, which means that it retained Kompetenzkompetenz, i.e. was ultimately superior. 79 The normative state was not an expression of respect for elements of a "Rechtsstaat" (rule of law) but itself part of the political project, 80 as its confinement to the economic sphere and to politically accepted members of society showed.
The Nazis used the emergency decree of 1933, which remained in force until 1945, as symbolic and practical rejection of the rule of law, and as the basis of their legal revolution which vested Hitler with unlimited powers. 81 For the Nazis, the function of law was not to protect individual rights or to adhere to formal principles 82 but to serve "material justice." 83 Legal principles were not viewed as universal but as expressions of a community, i.e. the "people."
84 Ultimately, this equated with the Nazi's political project of a collective, "völkische" (people, used in a Nazi racial sense) order in which they appropriated the law by claiming that National Socialism expressed people's justice. 85 Fraenkel showed in great detail, with reference to numerous cases, the prerogative state in action. Legal principles such as the prohibition of retroactivity, ne bis in idem, and proportionality were disregarded. 86 Existing laws did not provide protection; where state or party organs deemed it politically opportune, they ignored or "corrected" judgments or other legal acts. This included cases of threatening individuals with "protective custody," i.e. being taken to a camp and subjected to a regime of ill-treatment, unless they forego their legal claims against the authorities. 87 Fraenkel recounted a case in which he advised his Jewish client in 1938 not to contest charges of a treacherous attack on the government for having uttered that a report in a Nazi paper is "old hat" 88 and to accept a short prison sentence, instead of risking that the Gestapo will send him to a concentration camp. 89 There were no effective remedies, even against acts that were clearly unlawful. This applied particularly to the Gestapo, whose acts were not subject to judicial review. 90 As Fraenkel highlighted, the courts themselves repeatedly refused to apply the letter of the law and denied legal protection, invoking the primacy of political considerations and showing deference to the Nazis 80. Id. at 62. 81. "Endowed with all the powers required by a state of siege, the National-Socialists were able to transform the constitutional and temporary dictatorship (intended to restore public order) into an unconstitutional and permanent dictatorship and to provide the framework of the National- This theory of the indirect war on Communism permits the extirpation of any movement which in the slightest sense can be construed as supporting communism.
92 [and] No discrimination was made among the various opponents of National-Socialism. They were all labelled Communists. Martial law was applied equally against all opponents of the present regime. Through the application of martial law, the National-Socialists obtained a monopoly of power and have maintained it through continuous use. In the Third Reich the police power controls the courts in the interests of political expediency."
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[P]olitics is that which political authorities choose to define as political. The classification of an action as political or non-political determines whether it will be dealt with according to law or according to the arbitrary preferences of the political authorities. The legal system of present day Germany is characterized by the fact that there are no matters safe from the intervention of the political authorities who, without any legal guarantees, are free to exercise discretion for political ends.
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For Fraenkel, the main rationale of the normative state was to maintain a legal system that was required for the functioning of capitalism. This included "freedom of enterprise, sanctity of contracts, private property, the right of the entrepreneur to control labor, regulation of unfair competition, regulation of patent, trade-mark rights, etc., legal protection for interest agreements, property and transfer for purposes of security." 96 A series of judgments illustrated how courts upheld legal principles in the sphere of commercial law.
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The normative state itself, however, was subject to considerations of race and class. Jews were denied any legal protection, which was reserved for what the regime called "constructive forces of the nation."
98 Workers were denied any independent representation, as trade unions were banned, and also denied labor rights. 99 The latter was part of the regime's economic policy, aimed at establishing its political-economic power, increasing employment and occupation, and sectoral reforms. 100 The economic policy served the interests of monopoly capitalism and was closely linked to nationalist and imperialist ambitions, including the military complex. 101 Fraenkel's Dual State was instantly recognized as a highly valuable analysis of Nazi Germany, particularly its legal order, and remains the only such work based on detailed empirical research that was carried out in Germany after 1933 and published at the time when the Nazis were still in power. It was widely reviewed in the Anglo-American world, largely favorably, and continues to be viewed by historians as the key work on the Nazi legal order.
102 Its analysis has therefore stood the test of time, with the qualification that Fraenkel paid limited attention to laws that embodied injustice, such as racial discrimination laws. in 1944) , is a wide ranging analysis of politics, economy, law, and society of Nazi Germany. It was based on a close reading of Nazi literature and materials, including official publications and newspaper reports, which Neumann analyzed with reference to the history of Germany's political thought and developments. His ostensible goal was to shed light on the underlying structure and dynamics of Nazi rule, with reference to examples of how it operated, and to refute what he viewed as misconceptions about its true nature.
Neumann argued that Nazi Germany lacks any clear ideology or structure, and is ultimately based on propaganda and violence:
In its external form as propaganda, totalitarian ideology differs from democratic ideologies not only because it is single and exclusive, but because it is fused with terror. . . . The democratic ideology is successful if it can persuade or attract; the National Socialist ideology persuades through its use of terror. Having thrived and capitalized on the structural deficits of Weimar Germany, Nazi rule was based on the role of a charismatic leader and the primacy of the political. Neumann showed how the Nazis, while initially endorsing it, later rejected the notion of a "totalitarian state," as "the doctrine of state supremacy had to be abandoned in Germany because claims of the party conflicted with the claims of the state."
105 In contrast to state-centric Italian fascism, this situation created theoretical and practical problems, leaving Neumann to conclude that "the state and the party stand side by side. Legally neither controls the other, each is sovereign in its own field-a constitutional situation which is self-contradictory." 106 Domestic policy combined anti-Semitism in pursuit of the friend-foe distinction 107 and as a scapegoating device with the subjugation and control of the individual in the name of the people. Anti-Semitism was a natural expression of racism in Germany, as it "had deep roots in German history." 108 However, "National Socialism is the first Anti-Semitic movement to advocate the complete destruction of the Jews."
109 In examining anti-Jewish legislation, Neumann commented on the difference between "National Socialism and bolshevism."
110 It is "[n]ot the persecution of political opponents-which is practiced in both countries-but the extermination of helpless individuals [that] is the prerogative of National Socialism." 111 The policy of eliminating "Jews from economic life was carried out in three forms: contractually, illegally, and by statute."
112 Its purpose was to redistribute "property among those strata of the population whose support is vital for the regime: the powerful financial and industrial capitalists" and to satisfy "the anti-capitalist longings of the Germany people." 113 The political function of the "present all-pervading Anti-Semitism" was to act as a "substitute for the class struggle . . . [to] provide a justification for eastern expansion . . . [and as] an expression of the rejection of Christianity and all it stands for." 114 For Neumann, an understanding of the close relationship between the Nazi party and monopoly capitalism was key to grasping the political and economic nature of the state, and its business policy:
The German economy of today has two broad and striking characteristics. It is a monopolistic economy-and a command economy. . . against allowing the party machine to infringe upon the authority of the bureaucracy. Dr. Frick had no intention of interfering with the terrorization of Jews; the beating of defenseless prisoners in the Brown shirt barracks; the kidnapping of communists, socialists, and pacifists; or the murder-'shot while trying to escape'-of political enemies. But the party must not interfere in business and administration. 117 However, as Neumann showed, the government did intervene, by pursuing economic policies that benefited big industrial business, leading to a situation where profit motives and the demands of economic recovery and a war economy met.
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Nazi foreign policy was based on notions of racial imperialism, with the ideology of expansion based on "tradition, geopolitics, and pro-natalism" as well as "a new international law."
119 Neumann demonstrated step-bystep how racial theory removed legal limits on state sovereignty in positive international law, to serve expansionist interests:
(1) By denying that states are subjects of international law, it denies the equality of all states and allows differentiation among them. (2) By denying that states have sovereignty, it destroys the last element of rationality in international relations. The spatial and functional limits inherent in the notion of state sovereignty disappear. (3) By proclaiming the sovereignty of the race, it subjects all racial Germans, whatever their nationality, to the law of the Germanic race. (4) By denying that international law exists among rival empires, it rejects any legal frontier to aggression, while at the same time it defends its own empire by a perverted Monroe Doctrine. (5) By applying the term international law to the relations between the folk groups within its empire, it destroys the last remnants of minority protection and invests minority oppression with the sanctity of international law. 120 Contrary to claims that Nazi Germany had become classless, its social policy, according to Neumann: consists in the acceptance and strengthening of the prevailing class character . . . of its ruling class, in the atomization of the subordinate strata through the destruction of every autonomous group mediating between them and the state, in the creation of the system of autocratic bureaucracies interfering in all human relations. The process of atomization extends even to the ruling class in part. It goes hand in hand with a process of differentiation within the mass party and within society that creates reliable élites, the regime plays off one group against the other and enables a minority to terrorize the majority.
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After careful examination of theories of the state, Neumann concluded that Nazi Germany is a non-state, "in which the ruling groups control the rest of the population directly, without the mediation of that rational through coercive apparatus hitherto known as the state."
122 It was characterized by what has been called "totalitarian pluralism."
123 This consisted of the NSDAP, a "machine" and "huge bureaucracy," 124 the army, monopoly capitalism, and bureaucracy (largely conservatively minded civil servants) operating as parallel, and at times competing, centers of power.
In this totalitarian pluralism, the ruling class "is far from homogenous. There are as many interests as there are groups. Nothing holds them together but the reign of terror and their fear lest the collapse of the regime destroys them all."
125 Totalitarian pluralism was therefore both intensely powerful and fragile:
Nothing remains but profits, power, prestige, and above all, fear. Devoid of any common loyalty and concerned solely with the preservation of their own interests, the ruling groups will break apart as soon as the miracle-producing Leader meets a worthy opponent. At present, each section needs the others. The army needs the party because the war is totalitarian. The army cannot organize society 'totally'; that is left to the party. The party, on the other hand, needs the army to win the war and thus stabilize and even aggrandize its own power. Both need monopolistic industry to guarantee continuous expansion. And all three need the bureaucracy to achieve the technical rationality without which the system could not operate. Each group is sovereign and authoritarian; each is equipped with legislative, administrative, and judicial power of its own; each is thus capable of carrying out swiftly and ruthlessly the necessary compromises among the four.
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In contrast to the ruling class, the ruled class was subject to "monistic, total, authoritarian organization" as the Nazis had "no faith in society." Yes, if law is merely the will of the sovereign; definitely not, if law, unlike the sovereign's command, must be rational either in form or in content. The National Socialist legal system is nothing but a technique of mass manipulation by terror. Criminal courts, together with the Gestapo, the public prosecutor, and the executioners, are now primarily practitioners of violence. Civil courts are primarily agents of the commands of monopolistic business organizations. 138 This difference in view between Neumann and Fraenkel has been attributed to the time of writing of the two books (with the initial dual state later replaced by complete lawlessness) but it is also clear that the two used different understandings of law, which explains their divergent conclusions in this regard.
139
The Behemoth was hailed as the most important analysis of Nazi Germany. It has been called "one of the classics of modern political analysis" 140 and remains central to an understanding of the history of Nazi Germany.
141
Neumann's analysis, also as a result of his work in the Office of Strategic Service from 1943 to 1945, had a practical bearing on the objectives of US post war policy, which focused on denazification, democratization, demilitarization, and decartelization. 142 Neumann's imprint was also visible in the Nuremberg trials (he was a member of the prosecution team). 143 In the collection of evidence, "relevant papers were sorted among four groups, each with a distinct prefix that referred to one of Neumann's quadrumvirate of power structures (NO = Nazi organization, that is, the party; NG = Nazi government; NOKW = Nazi Military High Command; and NI = Nazi industry)."
144

C. Assessment of Fraenkel's and Neumann's Work
The detailed scrutiny of the workings of National Socialism enabled Fraenkel and Neumann to develop theories, of the dual state and totalitarian pluralism respectively, which provided the intellectual tools for their incisive analysis. This analysis, informed by their own experiences and close study of primary sources, exposed the nature and structure of power, how it functioned in practice, and whose interests it served. Fraenkel as well as other works published by both authors at the time, 145 formed an integral part of the political resistance against Nazi Germany. By the time of their publication, both authors were in exile, and both books were clearly aimed at an Anglo-American audience. Their goal was to support the war effort and to influence both responses to Nazi Germany and plans for post-war policies, including in relation to criminal accountability and reconstruction. The reception of their work at the time suggests that it was highly influential in shaping understanding of the nature of Nazi Germany, even though its actual influence on policy making appears to have been limited. 146 Fraenkel's and Neumann's work holds critical lessons going beyond its time. Having experienced the defeat of a (flawed) order they had fought for (the Weimar Republic), and having experienced discrimination and violations first hand, both men used their intellect as weapons to fight back against a regime that had come to embody the antithesis of the rule of law. Both books are examples of engaged scholarship based on rigorous research and analysis. They, especially Neumann's work, drew on a range of disciplines, particularly law, political theory, and economics, which accounts for their breadth. 147 Their structural analysis, 148 which identified underlying material factors and "root causes," and functional analysis of how the system operated opened an unrivalled contextual understanding of a regime whose nature was subject to misconceptions at the time.
Their approach remains pertinent today when considering, in any given system, the relationship between law and power and the role of economic factors. It provides tools to gain a better understanding of the power structures of regimes and of how legal systems and institutions function to advance certain interests, including by establishing regimes of legalized terror. Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Libya under Muammar Ghaddafi, and North Korea are cases in point. 149 South Africa under apartheid is an example of a state which combined elements of the formal and the prerogative state. 150 A num-ber of other regimes have ruled on the basis of states of exception, often for decades, which have undermined legal protection, while at the same time maintaining a formal system in the economic sphere, also in line with neoliberal orthodoxies. 151 Security legislation frequently resembles aspects of the Gestapo law, reflecting the power (often political and economic) of security agencies and the military that are beyond the reach of courts. 152 The risk to the rule of law inherent in creating special regimes for "enemies" based on political considerations has come to be embodied in Guantánamo Bay. The developments post 9/11 triggered a revival of interest in Carl Schmitt's ideas of a powerful state unrestrained by liberal laws, 153 which Fraenkel and Neumann repeatedly criticized. The potential that notions of material justice based on exclusionary communal notions (whether they rest on class, religion, ethnicity, or other factors) result in, or justify violations of individual rights has also been evident. 154 However, as Fraenkel emphasized, his analysis was confined to Nazi Germany, 155 and the nature of other regimes would need to be examined carefully. This is an important caveat, which points to a crucial aspect of Fraenkel's work. It was empirical, and combined legal with political and sociological observations, seeking to develop a theory that explained the practice he knew and was confronted with.
Fraenkel's and Neumann's mode of analysis and theories also have wider application. They are particularly useful when considering how, and for whose benefit, states and other entities, such as multinational corporations, use the law, and what impact this has on those denied the protection of law. 156 Such an understanding can have important strategic value for human rights actors in terms of how to frame advocacy, whom to target, and what action to propose in response. It calls for a nuanced and contextualized approach to entities such as "the state" and how to engage with them and, in so far as, and to the extent that it is possible, to de-and re-construct them, where necessary.
IV. CONCLUSION
Klemperer, Fraenkel, and Neumann are powerful voices of individuals who experienced systematic discrimination on account of being Jewish, and, in the case of Fraenkel and Neumann, for their political work. All three used the intellectual means at their disposal to resist the Nazis; Klemperer primarily analyzing language and Fraenkel and Neumann analyzing the legal and political system. All three benefited from having lived in a system, which, however flawed, had guaranteed a measure of intellectual freedom and legal protection. This, together with their education and rootedness in what may, at the risk of simplification, be broadly termed enlightenment thought (Klemperer) and socialist thought (Fraenkel and Neumann), served as counterweight that gave strength to their convictions and analysis. One of the most striking aspects of the work of "leftist" Fraenkel and Neumann was their spirited defense of the rule of law. They acknowledged the problems faced by the liberal order and rule of law in Weimar Germany but, instead of replacing it altogether, called for the state and the law to be anchored in a socialist order. Neumann defended the notion of general, formal law as an important constraint and protection against an order ultimately based on political and economic prerogatives of those in a position of power.
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It was clear to him, Fraenkel, and others, such as Otto Kirchheimer, 158 that the erosion if not destruction of formal law and legal protection would open the door to justify discrimination and abuses, whatever theory or ideology is drawn upon to legitimize an alternative, material order. As William Scheuerman points out:
Neumann and Kirchheimer present an impressive challenge to the knee-jerk hostility to liberal legalism widespread in contemporary critical legal scholarship. Witnesses to the tragic destruction of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Nazism, Neumann and Kirchheimer argued early on that crucial components of the rule of law are threatened in the twentieth century by a series of unprecedented political and social transformations. To abandon universalism because of its failures is like rejecting civil rights because they help legitimize and veil class exploitation, or democracy because it conceals boss control, or Christianity because churches have corrupted Christian morals. Faced with a corrupt administration of justice, the reasonable person does not demand a return to the war of each against all, but fights for an honest system. Likewise, when we have shown that international law has been misused for imperialistic aims, our task has begun, not ended. We must fight against imperialism. 160 These words strongly resonate today, stressing the importance of rights, democracy, and international solidarity in the fight against myriad forms of injustice. A critical awareness of the challenges inherent in these notions is an integral part of this struggle and not a reason to abandon them altogether and thereby risk leaving the ground to their enemies. Such awareness plays an important role in warding off any portrayal of human rights actors as being at best naïve or at worst cheerleaders for a neo-imperial world order.
The account of Klemperer's, Fraenkel's and Neumann's work does not suggest that their analysis was either representative (of Jews or socialists) or flawless. It reflects their political orientation as well as social positions and experiences as largely or fully assimilated, middle-class (broadly speaking) Jews in Germany at the time. As males, and in tune with their time, a gender analysis of Nazi Germany is notably absent. 161 These qualifications notwithstanding, their legacy transcends their historical context. They are impressive figures in a long line of women and men who have used the power of thought and language to fight injustice and to advocate for an alternative that takes suffering and rights seriously. 162 Their work underscores the power of documentation and analysis as praxis of resistance, as construction of alternative political models, and as memory and education. Their engagement, though originating in a very different context, carries a number of important lessons for today's human rights practice. It can be translated as a call from the past to be rigorous in analyzing how a regime or system operates and how it impacts individuals, institutions, and society at large. This requires paying close attention to language and documents, i.e. to take the outputs of a regime seriously, so as to identify its underlying ideology and motivations. It also includes a focus on understanding the political, social, and economic logic of a system. Drawing on multiple disciplines when analyzing 160 the causes and enabling factors of violations, and developing theories that help explain the realities of a regime or system are critical to unmasking their underlying ideology and better grasping their modus operandi. Using these findings in public debate and in other channels is part of broader struggles to challenge and defeat a rights-violating regime, or change a rights-violating system, and to set out alternative approaches that help rebuild societies by providing them with a political and moral compass. Fraenkel and Neumann, and Klemperer to some extent, did this for Germany, though their contribution was only recognized belatedly. It is now time that their contribution to the rule of law and human rights engagement more broadly be fully appreciated, as they have a lot to offer, having fought with all their intellectual might against a regime whose abomination provided the impetus for today's system of international human rights protection.
